at first appears to be a surprising and anomalous set of events, given that this group 12 was hitherto considered to be too marginal and lacking in influence to raise official At the beginning of 1945, shortly before the war ended, a small group of 26 London anarchists associated with the radical anti-militarist and anti-war 27 publication War Commentary were arrested and prosecuted. Given that 28 this group was hitherto considered to be too marginal and uninfluential to 29 raise official concern, this at first appears to be a surprising and anomalous 30 set of events. The government decision to suppress a minor publication 31 at such a late stage in the war using controversial emergency legislation 32 has been described as "rather curious" and "difficult to understand" by 33 commentators. doubt on the sincerity of the British establishment's hostility to fascism. 50 Links between the various anti-parliamentary groups, left communists, 51 anarchists, and war resisters were established in meetings such as the 52 Workers' Open Forum, advertised by the APCF as "a workers' council for 53 eliminating error" and addressed by independent radicals, anarchists, 54 socialists, members of the Peace Pledge Union, and others. 4 55 British officials pursued conflicting policies towards the activities of War 56 Commentary during the war. Despite the virulent anti-war stance of the 57 paper, the government was reluctant to engage in overt censorship of the 58 anarchists until April 1945 , when it drew on the full force of the available 59 wartime defence regulations to curtail their publishing activities. At the 60 height of the strategic bombing campaign in Germany the authorities had 61 been carefully monitoring the material which appeared in War Commentary.
62
At this point, however, the government had decided not to invoke any 63 special measures (or emergency powers) to suppress a group which had not 64 seemed to pose a credible threat either to the war effort or to public order on 65 the home front. Among other things, the government had been concerned 66 about the possible publicity that a crackdown on an otherwise obscure 67 movement might produce. However, when the war was in its final stages, 68 the government's attitude toward censoring anarchist propaganda changed 69 2. I include those non-communist forces on and to Labour's left such as the Independent LabourParty (ILP), and the Trotskyist elements inside and outside the Communist Party, although these, admittedly, also wished to offer an alternative to both official communism and Labour Party policies. 3. See Mark Shipway, Anti-Parliamentary Communism: The Movement for Workers' Councils in Britain, 1917 -1945 (Basingstoke, 1988 . See also the following documentation of political materials: Wildcat Group, Class War on the Home Front! Revolutionary Opposition to the Second World War (Manchester, 1986 ). 4. The Peace Pledge Union (PPU) is a British pacifist non-governmental organization establishedby Dick Sheppard in 1934. Regarding the Workers' Open Forum see Shipway, AntiParliamentary Communism, ch. 8.
significantly. As this article will show in detail, the authorities decided to 70 begin acting against the British anarchists in late 1944 because they were 71 concerned that the revolutionary messages being disseminated in the pages 72 of War Commentary might find a much wider and more receptive audience 73 once the fighting ended and soldiers began returning home. Hewetson, and Sansom were found guilty and sentenced (Berneri was 22 6 acquitted on a legal technicality that allows that a wife cannot be guilty of 22 7 conspiracy with her husband). The judge was Norman Birkett, and the The committee was also broadly concerned to guard free speech and went on 24 8 to oppose the continuance of military and industrial conscription after the 24 9 war. The anarchists found that their profile was raised from magazines of Wealth printed an article on the state of political censorship in Britain which 261 was fiercely critical of the War Commentary prosecution, which it saw as "a 262 test case" in the use of emergency legislation to "crush political opposition", 263 and evidence that "the Government could easily stifle all opposition 264 together". Also, it was noted in Common Wealth (a left-wing publication 265 aligned with cooperative, syndicalist, and guild socialist traditions), "there 266 is every sign of terror at the prospect of a political awakening in the 267 Services". If the prosecution was successful, it was argued, "the way will be 268 clear for the Government to make further and wider application of its 269 powers to suppress opinion and to imprison its political opponents".
270
Read addressed the public protests about the prosecution with sweeping 271 condemnations of the government, and the class oppression underpinning 272 The Freedom Press writers urged disobedience even before the war started: 392 "Refuse to serve 'your' country!", and "Refuse to assist the state in its 393 manoeuvres for murder!". 34 In order to resist the war, they claimed, it was 394 necessary to resist the militaristic policies of national service and conscription 395 regardless of "the fall of France", "Dunkirk", or the "Stalinist switchover". 35 396
In 1938 and 1939, when signs of war seemed already evident, the 397 Freedom Press turned against official claims to be waging war in the name 398 of democracy or international justice, repeatedly referring to the Spanish 399 experience. Looking at British policy towards the Spanish republic in the 400 1930s, they argued, "we discover that the policy of the present government 401 has in every respect been one of active support for fascism", and further 402 "not once was it suggested that we should go to defend Spanish democ- 403 475 According to Edgerton, the failure or refusal to recognize the British 476 warfare state is "longstanding", "systematic", and "deeply entrenched" in 477 political commentary and historical writing, and he argues that "by contrast 478 Ewing and Gearty emphasize "the degree to which emergency rather than 526 ordinary law was the normal state of affairs" between 1914-1945. 58 As they 527 and other authors argue, emergency powers, as a means of legally restricting 528 liberties, were used during this period to temper political democratization. 529 This includes the attempt to dilute the impact of full adult suffrage on the 530 established hereditary hierarchies associated with the old order, which had 531 perceived the "triple shock" of World War I, the Irish secession, and the 532 Russian Revolution as evidence of what it might expect from the democratic 533 transformation of society. However, despite the fact that "the government 534 were involved in a process designed to stifle forms of political opposition 535 more or less continuously throughout the war", both the Chamberlain and 536 the Churchill governments were careful to employ informal tactics rather 537 than public policy methods to control and censor dissident political orga-538 nization, precisely in order to "maintain a democratic image", and avoid 539 publicizing undesirable views and organizations. 59 540
In a Cabinet memo concerning anti-war propaganda it was argued that if 541 prosecutions were brought against anti-war groups those groups might 542 attract more sympathy than they would otherwise have done. 60 Sir John 543 Anderson, the Home Secretary (minister of the interior), explicitly stated, 544 regarding the use of the law in this context, that "it was contrary to our 545 traditions to use this method against a purely political organisation". 61 546
Instead, it was recommended that a policy of covert action and normal law 547 was employed to control anti-war and anti-government propaganda, such 548 as the use of section 5 of the Public Order Act, regarding behaviour likely to 549 cause a breach of the peace. 62 The Public Order Act was indeed used as a 550 political weapon to suppress, for instance, the Communist Party leaflet 551 "The People Must Act", and the communist Daily Worker, following 552 instructions by the War Cabinet to chief constables. on the allied bombing campaigns: "it does seem to me extraordinary that 559 this sort of disgusting material is allowed to be published in this country". 64 560 This careful approach to their publication was recognized by the anarchists. of sufficient influence to justify any drastic action on his part, more so as he is 565 so unpopular, and presumably does not want to be even more so". tary was overtly "obstructionist in its attitude to the present war effort", 66 571 senior staff at the Home Office took the position that "poisonous as it is, it 572 can perhaps be safely ignored". 67 Notes on the Home Office files for this 573 period regard the publication as "rather academic" and "confined mainly to 574 pacifists". 68 The prevailing opinion seems to have been that whilst " [...] it would appear undesirable to take any steps against it for the following 594 reasons: 1) It would afford publicity for an obscure publication which by reason of 595 its small circulationisunlikelyto have muchinfluence.2)Any attempt to suppressit 596 could be represented as an attack on a) democratic liberties b) the working classes. In response to an article in War Commentary that caused particular con-599 cern at the Ministry of Labour and National Service in May 1944 entitled 600 "Bevin Declares War on Miners", the Home Office again argued against 601 proceedings on the grounds that they "would provide an opportunity for the 602 Anarchists to try to justify their statements in Court and to repeat their 603 misrepresentations with a chance of reaching a very much wider public 604 than they otherwise reach". 76 618 "Friends of the Freedom Press". In the circulation notes assessing the 619 intercepted material, which were attached to the Home Office file, the 620 authorities noted that: "it appears that special efforts are being made to keep 621 in contact with members of the 'Friends of the Freedom Press' who are 622 serving in the armed forces". 78 The letter in question was explicitly directed 674 quotes the letter in detail on the subject of discussion groups in the military 675 and their potential to become embryonic "Soldiers' Councils". "In view of 676 the seemingly dangerous material from a security angle, contained in this 677 circular letter", wrote Whitehead, "a special watch was kept on the sub-678 sequent editions of 'War Commentary'". 86 679
Particular issues of War Commentary were highlighted for special 680 attention by Whitehead. This included an issue from the beginning of 681 November 1944, notably the feature "All Power to the Soviets", which 682 concerned revolutionary action. He noted in particular those articles in 683 War Commentary which provided historical surveys of postwar insurrec-684 tionary activities in Germany, France, and Russia, entitled "Spontaneous 685 Insurrections", "Soldiers' Councils during the French Revolution", and 686 "Councils as Instruments of Politics". Whitehead's extensive quotes from 687 War Commentary in his report include the following, which featured in the 688 paper under a sub-heading referring to the "Lessons of 1917": 689
[...] the decline of Army discipline was a sort of natural process, long before the 690 revolutionary left began to take a hand. Wholesale desertions, complete disregard 691 of orders, attacks upon and even murders of unpopular officers, fraternization 692 with the German troops, blank refusal to go into attack; these were spontaneous 693 manifestations of revolutionary feeling. the object of such distribution is not to enlighten H.M.'s forces on the causes of 733 past mutinies and revolutions but to encourage them to prepare themselves to take 734 similar action when the right moment comes. Thus, the activities of Freedom Press were considered to be 'a more direct 737 incitement to mutiny'. 738 It was decided, in light of this "forward policy" to "nip these people's 739 activities in the bud before the end of the war with Germany". "Other-740 wise", argued Home Office staff in the following significant observation, 741 "they might have a dangerous influence after the armistice when men in the 742 forces were weary of military life and were perhaps not particularly eager to 743 police Germany, or to fight in more distant theatres of war, and had more 744 time at their disposal for reading and discussion". 94 This comment neatly 745 encapsulates the anxieties underpinning the decision to prosecute the 746 anarchists so late in the war. The decision was made in light of anticipated 747 tensions concerning the demobilization of conscripted civilian personnel at 748 the end of the war, and not in response to concerns about the successful 749 prosecution of the war itself. This reflects well-entrenched fears concerning 750 the possibility of postwar dissention and mutiny. Prosecution became 751 desirable because of official concerns about the social tensions likely to be 752 precipitated by large-scale demobilization. In the eyes of the government, 753 the police, and MI5 the concern was the following -with the second part of 754 the sentence revealing the degree to which the authorities were fearing 755 unrest during the impending period of demobilization: "if no action is taken 756 now it will be more difficult to take action later on when the position may 757 813 policy, and shows how the potential volatility of demobilization thwarted 814 wider government aims in the immediate postwar situation, in this case 815 maintaining a centrally planned labour force for controlled economic 816 reconstruction. 105 The rise of nationalist movements in Asia and Africa 817 further increased tensions around demobilization, threatening to merge 818 with social revolutions and destabilize the imperial powers in their structural 819 dependency on colonial resources. 106 820
Anarchist sensitivity to the militarized features of the British state in 821 the 1940s meant that they were primed and ready to pluck at the raw nerves 822 of the political elite regarding the contentious process of large-scale 823 demobilization. One of the convicted Freedom Press editors, Philip 824 Sansom, imprisoned after the trial, recorded his impressions of the tense 825 atmosphere surrounding demobilization and the acute official anxieties 826 around slipping military discipline: "Once we got inside", he recalled "we to be grave trouble", he fretted, "and the danger is that if the machine of 838 government which can spend money so recklessly in engaging in war, fails 839 to be equally reckless in rebuilding, there will be both the tendency and the 840 excuse for revolution". 109 In the event, in "one of the largest acts of collective indiscipline in British 848 military history", there were a significant number of protests, mutinies, and 849 "demob strikes" that challenged military authority after World War II, 850 particularly in India and the Middle East. In fact, as Silver notes, the 851 intensity and duration of the post-World-War-II wave of labour unrest in 852 colonial and post-colonial arenas was far higher and longer than the post-853 World-War-I wave, an important social revolutionary message from the 854 decolonizing non-Western world. 112 In the tense atmosphere building up to 855 these events, British officials decided to reverse their policy towards the 856 Freedom Group's subversive publication, risking controversy by pursuing 857 a prosecution that would silence their anti-militarist polemic. 858 
CONCLUSION

859
This article has attempted to clarify the positions taken by the government 860 and the anarchists in the course of the events leading to the prosecution and 861 trial of the editors of War Commentary in 1945 by placing them in wider 862 political and economic contexts. It casts an unfamiliar light on the rela-863 tionship between state and society in the final stages of the war and in the 864 immediate postwar period, highlighting the official perception of anarchist 865 anti-militarist polemic as potentially incendiary in a context of an increas-866 ingly hostile civil response to the militarization of life. 867 The actions of the Freedom Press group and the government were 868 embedded in the British social experience of war and in the international 869 dynamics of relations between capital and labour, demonstrating the extent 870 to which radicalism and dissent has been enmeshed in the dynamics of 871 world politics and war. The experience of World War I had shown that a 872 militarized establishment has reason to be particularly concerned about the 873 end of wars, especially when they involved conscripted personnel. The 874 focus of government concern towards the end of the war was the break-875 down of military regulation and official sources of authority as the soldiers 876 
